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Constitutionalizing the Public Trust Doctrine in Chile
Michael C. Blumm*
Matthew Hebert**
Chile, whose public has experienced widespread dissatisfaction with Chilean environmental
policies, seems poised to use the ongoing redrafting of its constitution to entrench the public trust
doctrine in its fundamental charter. The ancient doctrine, emanating from Roman law and reflected
in the 13th century Spanish treatise, Las Siete Partidas, offers the promise of making publicly
enforceable commitments to environmental protection that under current Chilean law have been
discretionary, and therefore unfulfilled. This paper explains what the public trust doctrine would
mean to Chileans if the constitutional drafting process, scheduled for completion in 2022, includes
the public trust doctrine, as advocated by an interdisciplinary white paper sponsored by the Chile
California Conservation Council in 2021. The white paper drew on language from the
Pennsylvania Constitution in making its recommendations. The proposed constitutional revisions
would enable Chile to meet the environmental challenges ahead while accommodating the
country’s commitment to private property.
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Introduction
A widespread perception exists among Chileans that current government institutions are
failing to protect the environment. 1 In a 2019 survey, eighty percent of Chileans stated that the
environment was in a bad or very bad state. 2 It is no surprise that environmental protection has
become an important issue in the ongoing constitutional reform taking place in Chile: in a
plebiscite held on October 25, 2020, seventy-eight percent of Chilean voters decided that a new
constitution was warranted.3 Support was even greater in areas of the country with a high
concentration of polluting industries, where eighty-nine percent of voters supported constitutional
reform.4
Although the current constitution nominally “promote[s] the preservation of nature,”5 it
has proven ineffective, as the government often prioritizes private property rights over the
protection of natural resources.6 More than merely just being too weak, some think the current
constitution inhibits environmental protection,7 due to its overprotection of private property and
the limits it imposes on the regulatory authority. For example, the government both grants and
vigorously protects private rights in water use, rather than protecting water as a public resource. 8

*Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
**2L at Lewis & Clark Law School.
1
CARL BAUER ET AL., THE PROTECTION OF NATURE AND A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR CHILE 8 (2021) [hereafter
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER]. As explained infra note 9, the White Paper was a product of several scholars commissioned
by the Chile California Conservation Exchange.
2
Carolina Suez, Chile Es el Pais En Que Mas Ha Crecido la Preocupacion por el Cambio Climatico, IPSOS (Dec. 12,
2019)
https://www.ipsos.com/es-cl/chile-es-el-pais-en-que-mas-ha-crecido-la-preocupacion-por-el-cambioclimatico. Seventy percent of Chileans surveyed also felt it was more important to prioritize the environment than
economic growth. Id.
3
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 3.
4
Id.
5
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No. 8(1), available in translation at
https://constituteproject.org/countries/Americas/Chile?lang=en.
6
See infra Part II, Section B.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See text accompanying infra notes 82–87.
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Because of the ongoing constitutional reform, Chile has an opportunity to ensure that
government produces greater environmental protection. One means of doing so, as advocated by
the Chile California Conservation Exchange (CCCX),9 would be to incorporate the public trust
doctrine into the constitutional text. Adopting constitutional trust principles would impose a duty
on the government to protect natural resources both for the present public and future generations,
a duty absent in the current constitutional framework.10 A constitutional public trust doctrine
would obligate both the Chilean legislature and other branches of government to take action to
protect the environment, and would also give courts a standard by which to judge the government’s
performance of this duty. Constitutionalizing the public trust doctrine would elevate public rights
and provide the increased environmental protection that Chileans seek.11
The public trust, an ancient doctrine dating at least to the Roman Empire,12 was imported
into Spanish civil law through Las Siete Partidas, a 13th century Castilian treatise of Spanish law
that contained language from the from the Justinian Institutes, endorsing what we now call the
public trust doctrine.13 The doctrine has a long history in the American-Anglo common law, where
it has become “one of the most important and far-reaching doctrines of American property law.” 14

9

The CCCX organizes conferences for California and Chilean public officials, academics, and non-governmental
organization staff to exchange information on environmental issues of mutual interest. THE WHITE PAPER, supra note
1, at 3. The third conference took place just as civil unrest was breaking out in Chile. Id. With travel restrictions
preventing a conference in 2020, CCCX took the opportunity to explore the public trust doctrine as an option for
reform in the constitutional process. Id.
10
See infra Part II, Section B.
11
Worth noting is that private rights will not be totally displaced. There is a strong tradition of accommodating private
rights in the public trust doctrine jurisprudence. See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Private Property: The Accommodation Principle, PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649 (2010) (illustrating that the public trust
doctrine’s effect on private property rights has not been to eliminate private property).
12
See J. INST., 2.1.1 (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1867).
13
Compare J. INST., 2.1.1 (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1867), with LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, 3.28.3 (Robert I. Burns, S.J.,
ed., Samuel Parsons Scott, trans., 2001); see Paul A. Barresi, The Right to an Ecologically Unimpaired Environment
as a Strategy for Achieving Environmentally Sustainable Human Societies Worldwide, 6 MACQUARIE J. INTL & COMP.
ENVTL. L. 3, 21 (2009) (explaining that Las Siete Partidas incorporated the concept of res communis as restated by
Justinian).
14
DAVID C. SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 5 (2d ed. 1997); see Harrison C. Dunning, The
Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516 (1989) (“The public trust
is a fundamental doctrine in American property law and should be recognized much more widely than it is today”).
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The doctrine maintains that natural resources are held in trust by the sovereign for the benefit of
the people, including future generations. 15
Chile is not the only South American country seeking increased environmental protection
through constitutional reform. On September 28, 2008 the Ecuadorian electorate overwhelmingly
affirmed a new constitution, 16 establishing a right of people to “benefit from the environment and
the natural wealth . . . to enjoy the good way of living.”17 And in 2018, the Colombian Supreme
Court, without using the term public trust, concluded that the Colombian government had a
sovereign duty to protect the Amazon forest for future generations.18 Both Colombia and Ecuador
recognize constitutional rights of nature, rights possessed by an ecosystem—declaring that
“[n]ature has the right to be restored.”19 Rights of nature reflect an indigenous tradition of seeing
ecosystems as connected, and humans as a part of the ecosystem they inhabit.20 Rights of nature
are ecocentric, not anthropocentric. The movement to protect environmental rights constitutionally
in Colombia21 and Ecuador22 provides some context for the movement in Chile.

15

See Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present
and Future Generations (Part I), 39 ENVT’L L. 43, 67 (2009) (“[T]he beneficiaries are citizens, both present and
future generations”).
16
Alexandra Valencia, UPDATE 6-Ecuador’s Correa Wins New Powers in “Historic” Vote, REUTERS (Sep. 28,
2008) (initial results showed “63 percent of voters backed Correa’s proposed constitutional reforms . . .”),
https://www.reuters.com/article/ecuador-correa/update-6-ecuadors-correa-wins-new-powers-in-historic-voteidUSN2834023520080929.
17
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE ECUADOR, art. 74 (2008),
available
in translation at
https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html.
18
Future Generations v. Colombia Ministry of Government and others, Corte Suprema de Justica [C.S.J.] [Supreme
Court], STC4360-2018 (April 4, 2018), translation and excerpts available at http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climatechange-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2018/20180405_11001-22-03-000-201800319-00_decision-1.pdf.
19
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE ECUADOR, art. 72; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 10,
2016, Sentencia T-622/16, Relatoria de la Corte Constitucional [R.C.C.] (§ 10.2) (Colom.), translated in Dignity Rts.
Project,
Del.
L.
Sch.,
Judgment
T-622/16
(The
Atrato
River
Case)
110
(2019),
https://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/riveratratodecisionenglishdrpdellaw.pdf.
20
See David Takacs, We Are the River, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 552–53 (2021) (chronicling the rights of nature
movement and providing examples from around the world).
21
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, art. 79–80, available in translation at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015.pdf?lang=en.
22
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE ECUADOR, art. 74.
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In this article we explore the benefits of constitutionalizing a Chilean public trust doctrine.
Part I provides background information about civil unrest in Chile, the process of drafting a new
Chilean constitution, and constitutional language suggested by the CCCX. Part II describes the
shortcomings of environmental constitutional protection now in Chile, beginning with a
description of the precipitating environmental events and explaining why the existing
constitutional language inadequately protects the environment. Part III briefly explains the roots
of the public trust doctrine, starting with its ancient Roman roots and incorporation into Las Siete
Partidas, and describes its basic elements. Part IV supplies examples of the public trust doctrine
in U.S. law, focusing on the constitutions of Pennsylvania and Hawaii that Chile might emulate.
Part V explores the potential effect of a constitutional public trust doctrine in Chile. Two likely
effects are the imposition of an enforceable duty on the government to take affirmative action to
protect the environment and a requirement to prioritize environmental protection over private
property rights. Part VI compares the enforcement mechanisms of Chile and the U.S., including
Chilean environmental courts which could play an important role in early enforcement of the
public trust doctrine. The article concludes by arguing for clear constitutional language to promote
legislative and executive action to protect the environment and judicial review by Chilean courts
to review legislative and executive efforts.

I. Background
Not long ago, Chile was considered one of the most stable democracies in Latin America. 23
However, late in 2019 Chile experienced violent civil unrest not seen since democracy was
restored to the country in 1990.24 In November 2019, Chile’s political parties reached an agreement

23

CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 5.
Id. From 1973 to 1990, Chile was governed by a military junta lead by Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet came to power
when the military executed a coup d’état to overthrow President Salvador Allende. The 1980 constitution is an
24
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to restore stability, promising constitutional reform legislation.25 The ensuing legislation
established a three-stage process.26
The first step was a plebiscite, held on October 25, 2020, in which seventy-eight percent
of Chilean voters supported a constitutional convention to draft a new constitution. 27 Support was
even greater in the so-called environmental “sacrifice zones,” that is, areas of the country with a
high concentration of polluting industries.28 Approval of the convention in these zones was eightynine percent, eleven percent higher than the general vote.29
Step two occurred in May 2021, when Chileans elected delegates to the convention. 30 The
process required gender parity and the inclusion of indigenous people. 31 The convention is
responsible for drafting a new constitution, and will hopefully have a draft by July 2022,32 after
which it will be dissolved.33 The text must be approved by two-thirds of the delegates. 34
Once approved, the third and final step will be a second plebiscite: Chilean citizens will
vote before the end of 2022 to either approve or reject the new constitution. 35 If approved, the new

enduring legacy of the military rule, and was heavily influenced by the neoliberal ideology of the Chicago Boys—a
group of economists educated in free market and monetarist economic theories at the University of Chicago. CARL
BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT: PRIVATIZATION, WATER MARKETS AND THE STATE IN CHILE 5,12–13 (1998).
25
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 5.
26
Id.
27
Pascale Bonnefoy, ‘An End to the Chapter of Dictatorship’: Chileans Vote to Draft a New Constitution, NEW YORK
TIMES
(Oct.
25,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/25/world/americas/chile-constitutionplebiscite.html?searchResultPosition=6.
28
THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 5.
29
Id.
30
Javier Sajuria & Julieta Suarez-Cao, Chile Elected Delegates to Draft a New Constitution—and It’s Not Tilted
Toward the Elites, WASHINGTON POST (Jun. 24, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/24/chileelected-delegates-draft-new-constitution-its-not-tilted-toward-elites/.
31
The convention is made up of 77 female delegates and 78 male delegates; 17 of the 155 seats were reserved for
indigenous people elected by indigenous citizens. Id.
32
See Somini Sengupta, Chile Writes a New Constitution, Confronting Climate Change Head On, NEW YORK TIMES
(Dec. 28, 2021) (“[Dr. Dorador, a Convention Member,] explains the timeline: a draft constitution by July”)
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/28/climate/chile-constitution-climate-change.html.
33
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER supra note 1, at 5.
34
Id.
35
Bonnefoy, supra note 27.
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constitution will take the place of the military junta’s 1980 constitution.36 If rejected, the 1980
constitution will remain in place. 37
Scholars from Chile and the United States, organized by the CCCX, produced a May 2021
report examining the public trust doctrine and evaluating its potential role in the new Chilean
constitution.38 The report, concluding that the public trust doctrine would provide an important
legal tool for environmental protection in Chile, suggested that the constitutional text should:
(1) establish a duty on the part of the State and its subordinate agencies to protect nature
(including the integrity of terrestrial, marine, and freshwater ecosystems) for the health and
benefit of the public including future generations and (2) provide that when it is in the public
interest to allow the private appropriation of natural resources the State has a duty to assure that
such private use does not substantially diminish public rights and is in the public interest.39

The report emphasized that the duty created by the constitutional public trust doctrine must be
enforceable by citizens.40 Because the process is ongoing, whether these recommendations will be
followed by the delegates is unknown.

II. Chile and the Environment
Demand for better environmental protection has been growing in Chile since 2004, when
contamination from a nearby pulp mill led to a massive die-off of black necked swans at the Carlos
Anwandter Sanctuary.41 The swan population was virtually wiped out. Before the pulp mill, there
were more than 5,000 swans in the sanctuary; within a year that number declined to just four.42
Autopsies revealed that the swans died of high concentrations of iron and other metals in the

36

CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 5.
Id.
38
Id. A multidisciplinary group of academics in the United States, video conferencing from April to September 2020,
produced a white paper on the public trust doctrine, which examined its history, judicial development, applications,
and current constitutional expressions. Id. The white paper was used to produce the report, which addressed challenges
and benefits of including the public trust doctrine in the new Chilean constitution. Id.
39
Id. at 25.
40
Id. at 24 (“For such a clause to be effective the Constitution must also enable citizens to enforce the public trust in
courts and administrative agencies”).
41
Id. at 5.
42
Steve Anderson, Celco Trashes Chile River Yet Again, Shuts Down Plant, PATAGONIA TIMES (Jun. 2007),
http://www.patagoniatimes.cl/content/view/114/26/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20071021025259/].
37
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water.43 This tragedy produced widespread protests and substantially changed the Chilean public’s
awareness of environmental issues.44

A. Inadequacy of Institutional Change
Public sentiment on environmental issues after the black swan die-off affected presidential
programs, court rulings, institutional changes, and the emergence of environmental campaigns. 45
Among the latter was the Patagonia Sin Represas (Patagonia Without Dams) campaign, which
successfully halted construction of the HidroAysén project. 46 Chilean courts more frequently ruled
in favor of the environment after the swan die-off.47 For example, in 2009 the Supreme Court of
Chile invalidated a permit for a coal-fired power plant48 because the plant was located in an area
restricted to recreational and green uses.49 Institutional change included creating the Ministry of
the Environment and the Superintendency of the Environment in 2010. 50 And in 2012, the Chilean
legislature created specialized environmental courts.51
Despite these institutional changes, public demand for the government to do more to
protect the environment has persisted. 52 From 2004 through 2018, news articles identified at least

43

Id.
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 5.
45
Id.
46
Id. The HidroAysén would have built five dams on the Baker and Pascua rivers in Patagonia. Id. The project would
have provided one-third of the country’s electricity but would have flooded 15,000 acres of land. Chilean Power Firm
Colbun Puts Project on Ice, BBC NEWS (May 31, 2012) https://www.bbc.com/news/business-18278167.
47
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 5.
48
Correa v. Commission Regional Del Medio Ambiente of Valparasio, Supreme Court, No. 1219-09 issued on July
22, 2009 at www.poderjudicial.cl; THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 6.
49
Rodrigo Ropert, The Campiche Case: Legal or Ideological Factors?, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 789, 789–90 (2010) (citing
the zoning plan, Decree No. 116/87 issued by the Housing and Urban Ministry on Aug. 5, 1987) (arguing that the
decision can be best explained as a reaction to the historical environmental problems in the area).
50
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 6.
51
Law No. 20600, June 18, 2012 (Chile) https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1041361. For more
information on Chile’s environmental courts, see text accompanying infra notes 248–54.
52
See supra note 2.
44
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283 socio-environmental conflicts created by investment projects.53 The Instituto Nacional de
Derechos Humanos, estimates over 120 ongoing environmental conflicts.54 A 2019 survey named
Chile among countries in the world with the worst public perception of the health of the
environment, with eighty percent of the Chilean public believing that the environment was in a
bad or very bad state.55
In 2015, former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet initiated a process to draft a new
constitution, initiating a series of self-convened meetings, known as cabildos and encuentros, at
the local, provincial, and national level, but the process ended unsuccessfully in 2017.56 Still, over
200,000 citizens met to discuss constitutional issues, after which social scientists issued a report57
concluding that environmental protection was among the highest of public priorities.58

B. The Inadequacy of Current Constitutional Language
Protecting the environment remains a high priority in the constitutional reform process,
reflecting the limits on environmental protection imposed by the current constitution. 59 Although
the constitution does contain environmental language, including an express fundamental right to

Carranza et al., Socio-environmental conflicts: An Underestimated Threat to Biodiversity Conservation, 110 ENV’L
SCIENCE & POL. 46, 47–48 (2020) (defining socio-environmental conflicts as “[e]nvironmental conflicts that also
include economic and/or social aspects . . .”).
54
Map of Socio-Environmental Conflicts in Chile, INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS,
https://mapaconflictos.indh.cl/#/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
55
See supra note 2.
56
Sergio Verdugo & Jorge Contesse, The Rise and Fall of a Constitutional Moment: Lessons from the Chilean
Experiment and the Failure of Bachelet’s Project, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG 1–2 (Mar. 13, 2018),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/03/the-rise-and-fall-of-a-constitutional-moment-lessons-from-the-chileanexperiment-and-the-failure-of-bachelets-project.
57
Id. The report, issued to President Bachelet, was made by quantifying the number of mentions each issued received
in the cabildos and encuentros.
58
See CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 6 (“[P]rotection of the environment emerged as one of the highest
priority [sic] and most selected concepts in the unsuccessful constitutional process initiated during the last Bachelet
Adminitration”). Environmental protection emerged as a high priority even in the absence of an organized campaign.
59
During the social unrest in October 2019, 65% of the self-convened councils across the country listed the
environment as a priority issue. Id.
53
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live in an unpolluted environment,60 environmental protection is discretionary, often thwarted by
the Chilean legislature, and fails to incorporate a public dimension of environmental protection.
The principal environmental protection in the Chilean constitution is a declared right to
live in an unpolluted environment.61 Article 19, No. 8(1) guarantees all persons “the right to live
in an environment free of contamination. It is the duty of the State to ensure that this right is not
jeopardized and to promote the preservation of nature.”62 The constitutional remedy for this
individual right is found in Article 20, No. 2, often referred to as recurso de protección,63 giving
citizens recourse to the courts “when the right to live in a pollution-free environment is affected
by an unlawful act or omission attributable to a particular authority or person.”64 However, Article
19, No. 8 anticipates potential conflicts between environmental and other fundamental rights,
stating that “[t]he law may establish specific restrictions on the exercise of certain rights or
freedoms to protect the environment,”65 essentially authorizing the legislature to create exemptions
to the constitutional environmental right.
Property rights and the right to carry out economic activity are among the rights which may
be restricted to prevent environmental contamination. Article 19, No. 24, states: “Only the law can
set the mode of acquiring property, of using, enjoying and disposing of it, and the limitations and
obligations that derive from its social function. This [social function] includes . . . the public utility
and health and the preservation of the environment . . . .”66 The Chilean government may impose
this limitation, the so-called “social function of property,”67 without compensation, for the

60

CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No. 8(1), available in translation at
https://constituteproject.org/countries/Americas/Chile?lang=en; see text accompanying infra note 62.
61
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No. 8(1).
62
Id.
63
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 6.
64
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 20, No. 2.
65
Id. art. 19, No. 8.
66
Id. art. 19, No. 24.
67
Id.
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conservation of the environment. 68 The government has not invoked this provision enough to
satisfy the Chilean public.
Two critical weaknesses with the constitution’s environmental protection provisions are
that they are discretionary, and they do not incorporate a public dimension of environmental
protection. Although Article 19, No. 8(1) seems to impose a duty that the state “promote the
preservation of nature,” that clause has proved to be too vague, and Chilean courts have given it
limited application,69 applying only to the state, not to private actions, and only to the natural
elements of the environment. 70 In practice, the state incorporates environmental protection only
when statutes and regulations impose specific obligations or duties. 71 Moreover, the social function
limitation on private property merely authorizes state action. The relevant language states that
“[o]nly the law can set the mode of acquiring property, of using, enjoying and disposing of it”;72
this language imposes no duty on the government to act, which explains why this provision has
not successfully curtailed the activities of private actors exercising individual rights adverse to
environmental health.73
The lack of a public dimension in environmental protection is a serious weakness of the
Chilean constitution. A public dimension would provide a collective, general interest, rather than
just an individual interest.74 Under the current constitution, only individuals can make

68

CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 7. The Chilean constitution recognizes a right to compensation when
property has been expropriated. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No. 24(3).
69
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 7.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No. 24(2) (emphasis added). The translation
provided by the report makes this point even more clear, “[o]nly the law may establish the manner by which property
may be . . . used.” CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 7 (emphasis added).
73
Even when it has been applied, this limitation has been controversial and has not established a widely accepted legal
theory to protect the environment by limiting individual economic rights. CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 7.
74
Id.
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environmental rights claims, and they can only do so if they have a personal interest that has been
directly affected.75
The constitution also prioritizes economic freedom and private property rights over
environmental rights,76 establishing the “public economic order,” a short list of fundamental
economic principles that have operated to restrict environmental protection.77 The 1980
constitution aimed to encourage a free market economy by “expanding private economic rights
and liberties [and] tightly restricting state economic activity and regulatory authority . . . .” 78
Article 19, No. 23 guarantees the freedom to acquire ownership over all types of property,79 a
broad guarantee establishing free appropriation as a general constitutional principle. Article 19’s
language is limited by an exclusion in the subsequent clause—“except [that property] which nature
has made common to all men or which should belong to the entire Nation and the law so
declares”80—but the exclusion extends only to public natural resources, which the legislature is
free to define.81
Water, for example, is not a declared public natural resource by the constitution.82 Water
rights are instead regulated by the Water Code, which announces that water is a “national good for

75

See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 20 (establishing a cause of action for an
individual whose rights have been affected).
76
See BAUER, supra note 24, at 18 (explaining that Article 19, No. 8 “is not usually considered an ‘economic’ right,
and it has weaker judicial protection than [other] economic rights . . .”).
77
See id. at 12, 17 (the public economic order “consists of broad private economic rights accompanied by tight limits
on state economic activities and regulatory powers”). The heart of the economic order is found in Article 19, No. 21–
26. Id. at 17.
78
Id. at 12.
79
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No 23 (“The constitution guarantees all persons:
Freedom to acquire ownership of all kinds of assets . . .”).
80
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No. 23.
81
Id. (“a law passed by qualified quorum may establish limitations or requirements for acquiring ownership over
specific property.”) (emphasis added).
82
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 8. In contrast, mineral resources are specifically protected by Article 19,
No. 24(6), giving the state “absolute, exclusive, inalienable and imprescriptible dominion of all mines.”
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No. 24(6). However, the legislature may allow
individuals to use and exploit mineral resources through “mining concessions.” Id. art. 19, No. 24(7).
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public use.”83 However, the designation as a good for public use is undermined in practice, because
while one cannot own the water itself, one can own the use of water.84 And the constitution
explicitly protects rights to use water once they have been privatized by the state.85 Article 19, No.
24 provides that “[t]he rights of individuals over the waters, recognized or constituted in
accordance with the law, will grant their holders the property over them.”86 So, once the legislature
has granted a water use right, that right is constitutionally protected property, requiring
compensation if taken by the state. 87
Chile recognizes a doctrine of public ownership,88 referring to goods or resources that are
held by the state and excluded from private property.89 The doctrine requires the state to manage
these resources under a distinct legal regime. 90 But, the public ownership doctrine is not explicitly
established in the Chilean constitution.91 Under the current constitution the legislature is free to
determine which goods or resources may be excluded from private ownership. 92 The legislature
can even decide to revoke a public designation after previously recognizing it.93

III. History and Elements of the Public Trust Doctrine
Although the common law concept of a trust has no counterpart in Spanish law,94 the root
of the public trust doctrine is the same in both the English common law and Spanish civil
traditions. Incorporating the public trust doctrine into the Chilean constitution would be as

See BAUER, supra note 24, at 34 (“Waters are defined as ‘national property for public use’”).
Id. at 35.
85
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No. 24(11).
86
Id.
87
See id. art. 19, No. 24(3)–(5) (guaranteeing compensation if a person’s property is expropriated).
88
THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 18.
89
BAUER, supra note 24, at 34.
90
THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 18.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 10.
83
84
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consistent with the Spanish civil law tradition as recognizing the doctrine in U.S. law was with
the English common law tradition. Understanding the doctrine’s history, and its basic elements
will help explain how it can remedy the ill effects of the current Chilean constitution.

A. Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine is ancient, dating at least to the Roman Empire and the Institutes
of Justinian. Book II of the Institutes announced that the air, running water, the sea, and the shores
of the sea are, by the law of nature, common to all humankind. 95 The Institutes stipulated that “[n]o
one, therefore is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects habitations,
monuments, and the buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law of nations.” 96
These recognized public rights—referred to as res communis—to access and make use of the sea
formed the basis of the modern public trust doctrine.
Las Siete Partidas, a 13th century Spanish compilation of Roman civil law, imported the
trust language from the Institutes of Justinian into Spanish law 97 by incorporating much of the res
communis concept restated by Justinian.98 Compiled during the reign of King Alfonso X of
Castile,99 the Partidas echoed Justinian, stating that the air, running water, and the sea and its
shores “belong in common to the creatures of this world . . . ,”100 adding rainwater to the list of
property which belongs in common to all creatures.101 Similar to the Institutes, the Partidas
recognized that everyone has a right to use this common property, the res communis, so long as
private property, such as a house or other edifice, was not damaged.102

95

J. INST., supra note 13, at 2.1.1.
Id.
97
LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 13, at 3.28.3.
98
Barresi, supra note 13, at 21.
99
See Laura Manzano Baena, CONFLICTING WORDS: THE PEACE TREATY OF MÜNSTER (1648) AND THE POLITICAL
CULTURE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC AND THE SPANISH MONARCHY 68 n.5 (2011).
100
LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 13, at 3.28.3.
101
Id.
102
Id.
96
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A trust concept was incorporated into English common law after the Magna Carta, as
reported by the treatise writer, Sir Mathew Hale in the 17th century.103 English common law
recognized public rights in tide and submerged lands owned by the king for the benefit of the
people to navigate and fish.104 The king had a duty to protect these public rights, according to
Hale.105
The public trust doctrine made its way to America from English common law, where today
it is “one of the most important and far-reaching doctrines of American property law.” 106 A seminal
American case was Arnold v. Mundy,107 which involved a dispute over oyster harvesting on the
Raritan River.108 The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that “the navigable rivers . . . the ports,
the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the land under the water . . . are
common to all the citizens, and that each has a right to use them according to his necessities . . .
.”109 The court concluded that the state, as sovereign, could not divest citizens of their common
right.110 This principle, articulated by the New Jersey court, was soon adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court.111

103

MATTHEW HALE, DE JURE MARIS (1670) reprinted in A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING
THERETO 370, 374 (1888).
104
See SLADE, supra note 14, at 5.
105
HALE supra note 103, at 374.
106
See SLADE, supra note 14, at 5.; Dunning, supra note 14.
107
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
108
Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 38. Arnold sued the Mundy group for trespass. Id. at 9.
109
Id. at 76–77.
110
Id. at 78.
111
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 420 (1842) (overturning the lower court decision in favor of Waddell,
who traced his title to seventeenth century grants from the King of England (the state cannot “make a direct and
absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right”); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Illinois (Illinois Central), 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892) (endorsing Arnold v. Mundy and Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee).
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B. Elements of the Public Trust Doctrine
A trust has three components: the res, the trustee, and the beneficiary. 112 The res is the
property, asset, or resource subject to the trust.113 In the public trust doctrine, the res is the natural
resource subject to protection.114 The trustee is the entity responsible for managing the res for the
benefit of the beneficiary. 115 Under the public trust doctrine, the trustee is the government.116 The
beneficiary is the person or entity benefiting from the property.117 The public trust doctrine
establishes the public, including future generations, as the beneficiary. 118
Traditionally, the doctrine applied to the beds of navigable waters. 119 However, as
Professor Joe Sax recognized decades ago, there was no reason the doctrine should not also apply
to air pollution, the dissemination of pesticides, the location of rights of way for utilities, and strip
mining or wetland filling.120 Professor Mary Christina Wood has argued for an expanded scope of
the doctrine because “the entire workings of nature operate together as a system.” 121 Over the last
50 years, the public trust res has in fact expanded to include ecological protection.122 For example,
the constitution of Hawaii imposes a duty on the state to “conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural
beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources . . . .”123

HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (2021).
Id.
114
Wood, supra note 15, at 78.
115
HESS ET AL., supra note 112.
116
Wood, supra note 15, at 68 (citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)).
117
HESS ET AL., supra note 112.
118
Wood, supra note 15.
119
See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (applying the public trust doctrine to the lakebed of Lake Michigan to
invalidate a grant made by the Illinois legislature, which attempted to convey to a railroad over 1000 acres of the
lakebed of Chicago harbor).
120
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 471, 557 (1970)
121
Wood, supra note 15, at 83 (“Recognizing this, it is difficult to find any resource that can be summarily excised
from public trust treatment”).
122
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 10; see Wood, supra note 15, at 80.
123
HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (amended 1978). For further discussion of the Hawaiian constitution, see infra Part IV,
Section D; see also In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 448-49 (Haw. 2000). (“[W]e
112
113

15
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4025564

The Pennsylvania constitution imposes a similar duty on that state.124 In 2012, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concluded that the constitution’s trust language restricted the legislature’s ability
to promote natural gas fracking by preempting a local zoning ordinance,125 and in 2017, the court
struck down a legislative funding scheme that diverted trust money from natural resources
conservation to balance the state budget.126
Central to understanding how the trust operates are the concepts of jus publicum and jus
privatum. Title to trust property is split into two estates, one dominant and the other subservient. 127
The dominant title, jus publicum, held by the state, is the public’s right to “fully use and enjoy trust
lands and waters for commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing and other related public purposes.”128
The subservient title, jus privatum, is the private right to use or possess trust land. 129 Although the
state can convey the jus privatum to a private owner, such a conveyance does not terminate the
public’s right to use the land. 130 The dominant jus publicum continues to be held by the state for
the benefit of the public after a conveyance of the jus privatum to a private party.131
As an attribute inherent in sovereignty 132 the public trust doctrine is like the police power
in that it cannot be abdicated. 133 But while the police power authorizes state action to protect the

see little sense in adhering to artificial distinctions [between surface and ground water] neither recognized by the
ancient system nor borne out in the present practical realities of this state”).
124
PA. CONST., art. 1 § 27.
125
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 978 (Pa. 2013) (“[W]e are constrained to hold that, in
enacting this provision of Act 13, the General Assembly transgressed its delegated police powers which, while broad
and flexible, are nevertheless limited by constitutional commands, including the Environmental Rights Amendment”).
For further discussion of the Pennsylvania constitution, see infra Part IV.
126
Pennsylvania Env’l Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 640 Pa. 55, 94 (2017). For further discussion of
Pennsylvania’s public trust doctrine, see infra Part IV, Section C.
127
SLADE, supra note 14, at 6.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 10; Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
133
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453 (“The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people
are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police powers . . .”).
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health, safety, and welfare of the public, the public trust doctrine imposes an obligation on the
government to use its power and authority to protect natural resources.134 Enforcement of this
obligation requires independent judicial review to ensure the government is adequately protecting
trust resources.135 Including explicit trust language in the constitution serves to bind all state
actors—the legislature and the executive in addition to the courts—so that trustee obligations
extend to all levels of government.136

IV. Examples of Public Trust Doctrine from U.S. Law 137
As a fundamental element of American property law,138 the public trust doctrine has had
widespread effects. Application of the doctrine has: 1) prevented a state from abdicating the duties
imposed upon it, either by selling trust resources or regulating contrary to the trust; 2) ensured that
the doctrine cannot be supplanted by legislation; 3) imposed trust duties on all levels of
government, including local governments; 4) required that trust resources be managed for the
preservation of the trust, not for the public interest generally; and 5) subjected private uses of trust
resources to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure against “substantial impairment” of trust
resources. Comparing the breadth of these results of these cases may be useful to Chileans in terms
of what a Chilean public trust doctrine might mean. This section explains some practical results of
the application of the public trust doctrine in the U.S.

134

CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 10.
See Sax, supra note 120, at 490 (“When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general
public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to
reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties”).
136
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 10.
137
For international examples of the application of the public trust doctrine, see Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D.
Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to
Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C.D. L. REV. 741 (2012).
138
See Dunning, supra note 14.
135
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A. The Non-Alienation Principle
The preeminent public trust case in the U.S. is Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,139
involving a 1869 conveyance by the Illinois state legislature of over 1000 acres of the Lake
Michigan lakebed along the central business district of Chicago to a railroad.140 Four years later,
the state legislature repealed the 1869 grant.141 The Supreme Court eventually142 concluded that
an expansive grant of a public natural resource was necessarily revokable because the ownership
of the lakebed was a subject of public concern. 143 Because the state held these lands in trust, they
could not be alienated. 144
The Illinois Central court ruled that the trust, “which can only be discharged by the
management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by
a transfer of the property.”145 The court made clear that the state was not free to abdicate its role
as trustee; it could not leave trust resources “entirely under the use and control of private
parties.”146 Moreover, the state may not allow “substantial impairment” of the public interest in
trust resources,147 giving the trust doctrine an environmental dimension.

139

Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (affirming the circuit court for the northern district of Illinois and concluding
that the Illinois state legislature could revoke a grant to Illinois Central Railroad of a large portion of the bed of lake
Michigan). Professor Sax considered this case as the “lodestar” of the doctrine in American law. Sax, supra note 120,
at 489.
140
Sax, supra note 120, at 489.
141
Id.; Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 449.
142
It took some two decades for the case to reach the Supreme Court, as explained in Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas
W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 799, 913–19 (2004).
143
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455.
144
Id. Although, the court made clear that small concessions might be acceptable, so long as the public interest is not
harmed. Id. at 455-56.
145
Id. at 453.
146
Id.
147
Id.
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B. The Obligations of the Trustee
In 1983, the California Supreme Court decided an important public trust doctrine case in
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake).148 Mono Lake is a
terminal desert lake located on the eastern side of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. 149 The saline lake
has no outlet, losing water only through evaporation. 150 As the water evaporates, natural salts are
left behind.151 The lake is fed by several streams, to which the City of Los Angeles began acquiring
water rights in the early 1900s.152 In 1940, the city applied to the state water board for the right to
appropriate water from the tributaries. 153 The board approved the diversion, believing it lacked the
authority to deny the application, stating “[i]t is indeed unfortunate that the City’s proposed
development will result in decreasing the aesthetic advantages of Mono Basin but there is
apparently nothing that this office can do to prevent it.”154 The city proceeded to increase its export
of water in the 1970s by building a second aqueduct, consistent with its 1940 water right.155 By
October 1979, the lake had shrunk from an area of 85 square miles to 60.3 square miles, dropping
43 feet in elevation from its pre-diversion level and portending ecological disaster. 156
The State Water Board claimed that it lacked the authority to protect the lake when it
permitted the diversions in 1940, a proposition rejected by the California Supreme Court 157
because the public trust doctrine had always existed in the state and the scope of the doctrine

Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Ct. (Mono Lake), 33 Cal.3d 419 (1983) (reversing the lower court decision and
held that the public trust doctrine applied to tributaries of a navigable water body).
149
THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 11.
150
Mono Lake, 33 Cal.3d at 429.
151
Id.
152
THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 11.
153
Mono Lake, 33 Cal.3d at 427.
154
Id. at 428.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 429.
157
Id. at 447–48.
148
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extended beyond the navigable waters to include non-navigable tributaries. 158 The court concluded
that the state had a trust duty to protect “the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes,
marshlands and tidelands.”159 The court described this affirmative state obligation as a continuous
supervisory duty.160 The state fulfilled this directive by promulgating a 1994 plan to restore about
half of the lake’s water level, but climate change-induced drought has limited the effects of the
plan.161
C. The Distinction Between a Trustee and a Proprietor
Pennsylvania’s constitutional public trust doctrine162 was ratified by a 1971 public
referendum by a margin of nearly four to one. 163 The constitution recognizes the right of the people
to clean air, pure water, and “to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
of the environment.”164 Further, “Pennsylvania’s natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come.”165 The constitution establishes that the state, as the
trustee, is obligated to conserve and maintain trust resources for the benefit of the public. 166
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently interpreted this constitutional language in
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth167 and Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v.

158

Id. at 437. The court explained that the purpose of the doctrine has changed over time, from protecting the triad of
uses—navigation, commerce, and fishing—to including the preservation of trust lands in their natural state. Id. at 343.
159
Id. at 441.
160
Id. at 437 (“In the following review of the authority and obligations of the state as administrator of the public
trust, the dominant theme is the state’s . . . duty to exercise continued supervision over the trust”); see also id. at 447
(“Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the
taking and use of the appropriated water”).
161
Amend. of the City of Los Angeles’ Water Right Licenses for Diversion of Water from Streams Tributary to
Mono Lake, Cal. State Water Resources Control Bd. Decision 1631, 2–3 (1994) (ordering restrictions of water
exports to restore the water level of Mono Lake to an elevation of 6,391 feet over the course of 20 years). However,
the current elevation of Mono Lake is 6,379.9 feet, 11 feet below the restoration goal. State of the Lake, MONO LAKE
COMMITTEE (last visited Jan. 29, 2022) https://www.monolake.org/learn/stateofthelake/.
162
PA. CONST., art. 1 § 27.
163
Pennsylvania Env’l Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 640 Pa. 55, 64 (2017).
164
PA. CONST., art. 1 § 27.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
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Commonwealth.168 In 2013, in Robinson Township, a plurality of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania struck down as unconstitutional a statute promoting natural gas extraction through
hydraulic fracking by preempting local zoning laws.169 The court decided that the local
government was a trustee, and eliminating local control over trust resources violated the public
trust doctrine.170 The court stated, “[P]ublic trustee duties were delegated concomitantly to all
branches and levels of government in recognition that the quality of the environment is a task with
both local and statewide implications.” 171 This delegation was to “ensure that all government
neither infringed upon the people's rights nor failed to act for the benefit of the people. . . .”172 So,
in Pennsylvania, all branches of government are trustees, even local governments.173
In 2017, in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reaffirmed Robinson Township and held that rental payments from leases used to
extract oil and gas could fall within the corpus of the trust.174 The money from these leases was to
go to the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, under the Conservation and Natural
Resources Act.175 However, legislative amendments between 2008 and 2014 had redirected $335
million from conservation to the state’s general fund.176 The court ruled that although the
legislature had broad and flexible police powers, those powers were “expressly limited by
fundamental rights reserved to the people in Article I of [the state] Constitution.”177 Among the
fundamental rights reserved to the people in Article I were the rights announced in the 1971

Pennsylvania Env’l Defense Foundation, 640 Pa. at 55.
Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 1000.
170
Id. at 913.
171
Id. at 963.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 913.
174
Pennsylvania Env’l Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 640 Pa. 55, 96 (2017).
175
Id. at 71.
176
Id. at 78 (citing John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVT’L L. 463,
488 (2015)).
177
Id. at 88.
168
169
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constitution.178 Therefore, the police powers of the state could not override the public trust doctrine
obligations enshrined in the constitution. 179
The Pennsylvania court rejected the state’s argument that proceeds from the sale of natural
resources do not fall within the corpus of the trust, stating “the Commonwealth improperly
conceives of itself as a mere proprietor of those public natural resources, rather than a trustee.” 180
The state was not free to sell off trust assets for any purpose that might benefit the public in some
way; it had to fulfill its fiduciary obligation to preserve trust resources.181 The court concluded that
when a trust asset is sold, all revenue received in exchange for that asset must return to the trust as
part of its corpus.182 Fulfillment of the public trust doctrine obligations is narrower than simply
acting in the public interest.
D. The Principle of Heightened Judicial Scrutiny
Hawaii has also codified the public trust doctrine in its constitution. 183 The Hawaii
Supreme Court interpreted the state’s constitutional public trust doctrine in the Waiahole Ditch
case,184 involving a transbasin diversion of groundwater 185 for large-scale agricultural uses
harming native Hawaiian users.186 The court “reaffirm[ed] that . . . the public trust doctrine applies

178

Id. (citing PA. CONST., art. I, § 27).
See id. (“As forcefully pronounced in Section 25, the rights contained in Article I are ‘excepted out of the general
powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate’”).
180
Id. at 94.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
HAW. CONST., art. XI § 1 states:
179

For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall
conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water,
air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these
resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the selfsufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit
of the people.
184

Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
Id. at 422–23.
186
Id. at 423–24.
185
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to all water resources without exception or distinction.”187 Moreover, use of this trust resource
extended beyond the traditional triad of fishing, navigation, and commerce to include recreation,
protection of ecology, domestic use, and traditional Hawaiian uses. 188 The court rejected the state’s
argument that the public trust doctrine had been supplanted by the water code because the trust
exists independent of any statute—both constitutionally and as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty.189 The court concluded that private uses, like groundwater exports that interfere with
trust uses, are subject to a higher level of judicial scrutiny, and that commercial use is not among
the public purposes protected by the trust. 190
The public trust doctrine can provide robust environmental protection because it imposes
a duty on the state not merely to act in the public interest, but to preserve trust resources for the
benefit of current and future generations. This duty cannot be abdicated by the state, nor can the
trust be supplanted by legislation. The doctrine is inherently anti-monopolization, limiting
privatization and subjecting private commercial uses of trust resources to heighted judicial
scrutiny. The public trust requires the state trustee to protect trust resources against substantial
impairment of the public’s interest in those resources.

V. The Potential Effect of a Constitutional Public Trust Doctrine in Chile
The 1980 constitution has failed to adequately protect the Chilean environment and
nature.191 The ongoing constitutional drafting process offers an opportunity to incorporate
constitutional protection of the environment. 192 Constitutionalizing the public trust doctrine would
empower the Chilean government to regulate natural resources without the threat of a

187

Id. at 445.
Id. at 449.
189
Id. at 442–445.
190
Id. at 450.
191
THE WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 17.
192
Id.
188
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compensatory taking. The public trust doctrine would also impose an obligation on the state trustee
to protect the environment.
A. The Rule of No Compensation
Where private rights exist in public trust resources, the state’s jus publicum enables
regulation without paying compensation. 193 Although the U.S. Constitution prohibits government
taking of private property for public use without payment of just compensation,194 the U.S.
Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council195 held that no compensation is
required if a regulation mirrors an inherent limit in private title through a restriction “that
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance” already place upon land
ownership.196 The public trust doctrine is such a background principle that exempts state regulation
of trust resources from takings claims. 197
Chilean law has a constitutional provision that authorizes the government to expropriate
property for public use, but like takings in U.S. law not involving background principles,
expropriation requires compensation. 198 Moreover, absent an agreement, compensation must be
made in cash, and in response to a complaint about the justifiability of the expropriation, a judge

193

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
195
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
196
Id. at 1029. The law or regulation must do no more than duplicate the outcome that could have been achieved by
adjacent landowners suing in court. Id.
197
See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard, Revisiting Background Principles in Takings Litigation, 71 FLA. L.
REV. 1165, 1183–84 (2019) (explaining recent case law).
198
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No. 24(3), available in translation at
https://constituteproject.org/countries/Americas/Chile?lang=en.
No one can, in any case, be deprived of his property, the assets affected or any of the essential
faculties or powers of the domain, but by virtue of a general or special law that authorizes
expropriation for public utility or national interest, qualified by the legislator. The expropriated may
protest the legality of the expropriation act before the ordinary courts and shall always have the right
to be compensated for the patrimonial damage effectively caused, which will be determined by
agreement or by a sentence dictated in accordance with the law by the said courts. Id.
194
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may suspend the expropriation.199 The public trust doctrine would not require compensation when
regulating consistently with the trust.

B. National Goods for Public Use and the Social Function of Property
Two provisions of the current Chilean constitution fulfill functions similar to the public
trust doctrine: 1) “national goods for public use”200 and 2) limitations on private property based on
the “social function” of the property. 201 The doctrine of public ownership (dominio público) is like
the public trust doctrine in that both refer to resources held by the state for particular purposes. 202
Public ownership excludes these assets from compensable private property obligations and
requires the state to manage the assets under a distinct legal regime. 203 The government cannot
dispose of publicly owned resources, but instead must manage them so they continue to fulfill their
public purpose.204 However, dominio público is not recognized in the Chilean constitution.205 The
current constitution does reference goods that necessarily belong to the entire nation,206 but this
provision is merely an exception to the rule that all goods are free for appropriation. 207 There is
also no existing constitutional obligation imposed on the government to protect nature; the
government is simply authorized to do so.208 The Chilean government has not pursued that option
aggressively under the current framework, and the Chilean public is demanding change.

199

Id. art. 19, No. 24(4)–(5).
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 17.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 18.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, No. 23(1) (“[E]xcept for [property] which
nature has made common to all men or which should belong to the whole nation and the law so declares”). However,
since the constitution does not define which property is common to all, this clause has little effect on the actions of
the Chilean government.
207
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 18; see also text accompanying supra notes 88–93.
208
CHILEAN WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 18.
200
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Nor does the constitution define which assets are in public ownership. 209 The legislature is
free to determine which resources are in public ownership and can even rescind that designation. 210
Mineral resources are an exception; they are constitutionally assigned to public ownership—
government mineral ownership is constitutionally “declared absolute, exclusive, inalienable, and
imprescriptible.”211 Despite this constitutional proclamation, Chilean mining law authorizes the
government to grant concessions to private parties that, once granted, are constitutionally protected
private property.212
The social function of private property, similar to the public trust doctrine, provides the
government with a defense against takings. 213 Two modifications to private property may be made
under the Chilean constitution: expropriation and limitation.214 As discussed previously,215
expropriation allows the state to take property from an individual for public use with payment of
compensation.216 Property serving a social function, on the other hand, enables the government to
impose limitations and obligations on that property without compensation.217 However,
restrictions based on social function are severely limited by the “principle of equal distribution of
public burdens,”218 and may still be declared unconstitutional if violative of that principle.219
Significantly, the social function doctrine operates only defensively, imposing no affirmative
obligation on the government to regulate. 220
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The public trust doctrine, on the other hand, imposes an affirmative duty on the government
to protect the environment—a duty enforceable by the public. Because Chile is a country with a
civil law tradition, constitutionalizing the trust could have two beneficial outcomes: 1) it would
require the legislature and administrative bodies to adopt measures to protect the environment;221
and 2) it would give courts a standard by which to measure state efforts to implement the trust.222

VI. Enforcing the Public Trust Doctrine in Chile
Legislative action in Chile is slow and uncertain.223 The Chilean water code, for example,
has scarcely changed since its 1981 enactment, despite widespread agreement that it needs
reform.224 Constitutional restrictions, such as the requirement for qualified quorums for the
legislature to regulate the basic organization of the public administration and define the powers of
the courts, have contributed to delayed legislative action.225 Another cause is the constant threat of
intervention by the Constitutional Court, a court that has restrictively interpreted the scope of the
Constitution, especially on economic matters.226 Although the U.S. Congress is also slow to act,
federalism allows a release-valve at the state level. State legislatures can be fairly active in
environmental issues and in land use planning.227 The unitary nature of the Chilean government
means that no similar release valve exists to side-step the legislative inactivity of the national
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congress.228 Therefore, vague, general language will not be quickly implemented by the Chilean
legislature, but a clear constitutional standard could provide political incentives to take action.229
Like the U.S., Chile has a presidential system of government. 230 Although the Chilean
president has greater influence over the legislative process than the American president, 231 both
systems struggle to enact legislation when the legislature and the presidency are controlled by
different political parties.232 Chilean presidential power is stronger than under the U.S. system,233
but independent regulatory power is rarely invoked and has been interpreted narrowly by the
courts.234 The Constitutional Court has narrowly interpreted the regulatory power of the Chilean
president through the “reservation of law” doctrine, which reserves certain types of regulation to
statutory law.235 Moreover, the Comptroller General of the Republic must also approve
administrative regulations before they can be promulgated.236 This requirement has imposed a kind
of veto, leaving little room for experimentation and innovation. 237 Thus, regulatory power in Chile
is much weaker than its system of government might suggest.238
Chile has no agencies that are independent of the president, and most agencies are run by
political appointees of the president.239 Public service lacks stability, professionalism, and training,
and there is little incentive to develop a career in administrative agencies. 240 Thus, there is a high
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degree of turnover.241 All of these factors contribute to an administrative system that is
comparatively weaker than its U.S. counterpart.242 However, a clear constitutional directive
incorporating the trust could spur regulatory authority,243 especially if citizens are able to use the
trust doctrine to insist that the government assume an active duty to protect nature through
regulatory agencies.244
Chile has adopted a system of specialized courts—some have jurisdiction over labor, some
over family disputes, some over environmental issues.245 These lower courts are subject to review
by respective Courts of Appeal, which are in turn subject to review by the Supreme Court. 246 There
is also a separate Constitutional Court, with jurisdiction distinct from the Supreme Court. 247
Chile has three specialized environmental courts, with jurisdiction split geographically
over the north, center, and south of the country. 248 These environmental courts can order the
restoration of environmental damage and invalidate illegal administrative actions. 249 However,
their jurisdiction is limited to claims 1) for the reparation of environmental damage against
executive decrees in specified matters, 2) against directives of the superintendency of the
environment, 3) against authorizations within the environmental impact assessment system for
investment projects, and 4) against other administrative acts related to the environment. 250 But the
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jurisdiction of the environmental courts does not extend to conflicts over the application of
regulations generally, even regulations pertaining to public waters, forests, and coastal areas.251
The Chilean public generally has a positive perception of these courts, especially in trials
related to environmental damage. 252 Environmental courts could become the primary enforcers of
the public trust doctrine. 253 By expanding their jurisdiction to include natural resource
management, these courts could play an important role in enforcing the constitutional public trust
doctrine, if the constitution clearly imposes a duty on the government to protect the
environment.254

Conclusion
With clear and specific language, constitutionalizing the public trust doctrine could
encourage and empower the Chilean legislature and executive to implement and administer the
trust, and enable Chilean courts to review the performance of the other branches. The Chilean
White Paper sponsored by the CCSX proposed the Pennsylvania constitutional language as a
model.255 The language should impose an active duty on the government to protect the
environment for the benefit of the public, including future generations. 256 Importantly, citizens
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Public Trust Doctrine”).
256
This duty should be enforceable by citizens. The CCCX report suggests the following principles:
[A] constitutional clause for the protection of nature that is inspired by the Public Trust Doctrine
should (1) establish a duty on the part of the State and its subordinate agencies to protect nature
including the integrity of terrestrial, marine, and freshwater ecosystems for the health and benefit
of the public including future generations and (2) provide that when it is in the public interest to
allow the private appropriation of natural resources the State has a duty to assure that such private
use does not substantially diminish public rights and is in the public interest. For such a clause
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must be empowered to enforce the public trust doctrine both in courts and administrative
agencies,257 so that implementation of the public trust doctrine is not discretionary.
The public trust doctrine is fully consistent with Chilean legal doctrines like the social
function of property and with the Spanish civil tradition codified in Las Siete Partidas.258 Because
a constitutional public trust doctrine would override existing constitutional protections of private
property,259 adoption of the doctrine would elevate the social function of property from a mere
factor, enforced at the legislature’s discretion, to a fundamental doctrine in Chilean private
property law.260 The public trust doctrine is capable of protecting the Chilean environment while
still accommodating private property, 261 yet will provide the Chilean government with a powerful
directive to confront current and future environmental challenges.

to be effective the Constitution must also enable citizens to enforce the public trust in courts and
administrative agencies. Id. at 24.
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The public trust doctrine would also be consistent with rights of nature recognized in other Latin American
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